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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES
SECTION 8-101. Investment Securities
Le Savoy Industries v. Pennsylvania General Paper Corp., 404 Pa. 161,
171 A.2d 148 (1961).
Under a Pennsylvania statute permitting extraterritorial service of
process if the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the court,
stock of the corporation has its situs where the stock certificate is sit-
uated. Although there is no express Code provision as to the situs of
stock, the court reaches its decision by reference to the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, which was law in Pennsylvania prior to the Code and
which was repealed by the Code. It declares that the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act and its policy in making the stock certificate represent the
shares of stock (a change from the common law rule) are embodied in
the Code. Hence, there was no Pennsylvania jurisdiction over a New
York shareholder served in New York when the stock certificates repre-
senting his shares were also in that state.
[Annotator's Comment: The decision is borne out by language in
the Code itself which seems to regard the stock certificate as repre-
senting the shares of stock. The Code's definition of a security in Sec-
tion 8-102 is "an instrument which evidences a share, participation or
other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation
of the issuer." Under Section 8-301, upon delivery of a security, the
transferee acquires the rights of the transferror in the security. Fur-
thermore, in a situation which is analogous to the service of process
issue in the instant case, the Code requires, under Section 8-317, actual
seizure of the security for a valid levy or attachment.]
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
SECTION 9-103. Accounts, Contract Rights, General Intangibles
and Equipment Relating to Another Jurisdiction;
and Incoming Goods Already Subject to a Security
Interest
(3) If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest attached and
before being brought into this state, the security interest continues perfected
in this state for four months „ .
Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Company, 171 A.2d 813 (Pa.
1961).
Where the assignee of a conditional sales contract in New York
protects his security interest by filing within the ten-day period allowed
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
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by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act which is law in New York, but at
a time after the property has been brought into Pennsylvania by a sub-
sequent purchaser, the assignee's security interest is perfected in Penn-
sylvania even though it is not noted upon the Pennsylvania certificate
of title as required for "perfection" under Code Section 9-302(3)(b) in
conjunction with the Motor Vehicle Code of Pennsylvania. The security
interest is prior to the interest of one who possesses an unencumbered
Pennsylvania certificate of title. The court bases its decision on (1)
the determination that the purpose of filing in New York is similar to
the purpose of perfection under the Code, so that one who files in New
York should be protected to the same extent as a Pennsylvania holder
of a perfected security interest; and (2) its conclusion that under New
York law the security interest was perfected immediately upon execu-
tion of the security agreement, but subject to losing its priority if the
contract was not filed within the proper time. Therefore, "perfection"
under the Code means only that the security interest is protected gen-
erally in the foreign state against classes of purchasers, creditors, and
lien holders against whom a perfected security interest is protected in
Pennsylvania, not that there be an exact parallel between the Uniform
Commercial Code and the law of the foreign state.
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 draft of the Code, in
which Section 9-103 read:
"(3) If the security interest was already perfected under the law
of the jurisdiction where the property was kept before being brought
into this state, the security interest continues perfected here for four
months. . .
[Annotator's Comment: An interesting contrast may be made
between the provisions under the Uniform Commercial Code in Penn-
sylvania and those under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in New
York as to secured property coming from one state into the other. In
Pennsylvania, the secured interest is protected for four months after
removal, provided it was perfected in New York. Thereafter, it must
be perfected according to Pennsylvania law. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A,
§ 9-103. In New York the foreign secured party, in order to protect his
interest, must file in the filing district to which the goods are removed
within ten days after receiving notice that the goods have been removed
to that state—i.e., if he files within ten days, his protection extends
prior to the filing; otherwise, it extends only subsequently to the filing.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 74. However, in New York, the secured party
is protected even without filing against a subsequent purchaser with
notice. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65. This may be very important to a
secured party of Pennsylvania or other certificate of title state, because
it is the practice in New York to demand surrender of foreign certifi-
cates of title as a condition to New York registration. Thus, in many
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
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cases, the certificate of title from Pennsylvania with the security inter-
est conspicuously noted thereon could serve as notice to a subsequent
purchaser in New York.]
SECTION 9-302. When Filing Is Required to Perfect Security In-
terest; Security Interests to Which Filing Provisions
of this Article Do Not Apply
(3) The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security in-
terest in property subject to a statute
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which
requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such
property. -
Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600
(1961)
An acceptance company which had its security interest on the in-
ventory of a car dealer perfected according to Section 9-302(1) could
not recover a new automobile purchased subsequently by the defendant
from that car dealer's inventory. The acceptance company attempted
to avoid the application of the Uniform Commercial Code by pleading
this section. The court held that the Vehicle Code of Pennsylvania,
which states that "the certificate of title when issued by the secretary
showing a lien or encumbrance shall be adequate notice . . . that a lien
. . . exists . . . ." is not such a statute as that referred to in Section 9-
302(3)(b) in the case of the sale of a new automobile, because the
Vehicle Code does not require dealers to obtain certificates 'of title for
new automobiles until the sale thereof. Thus, the court concludes, "the
legislature did not intend to have the rights of buyers of new automo-
biles set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code defeated by lien credi-
tors of the dealer, through the notings of encumbrances upon dealers'
certificates of title which were not required and generally were not
issued."
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 draft of the Code
which carried this section as Section 9-302(2)(b).[
[Annotator's Comment: Although the decision is correct, the rea-
soning of the court and its clear implication that if the car were a used
one, the acceptance company could recover it because certificates of
title were required for used cars seem erroneous. The court seems to
err by treating Section 9-302(3)(b) as a clause completely excluding
certain situations from the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which it does not do. Section 9-302(3)(b) merely exempts from the
Code filing required for perfection certain situations which are covered
by other filing or certificate of title statutes. Perfection may be obtained
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
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in these situations by complying with the other statute rather than filing
under the Code. However, Section 9-307 protects the buyer of inven-
tory in the ordinary course of business even though a prior security
interest is perfected. Thus, the buyer of even a used car from inventory
would prevail because his interest is prior to the perfected status at-
tained through Section 9-302(3) (b) by compliance with the Pennsyl-
vania Motor Vehicle Code.]
Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961)
A statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 186.195 (1959), providing that,
upon execution of a lien upon a motor vehicle, the secured party must
deliver the registration receipt of the owner to the county clerk for
recordation of the lien upon it, is not such a statute as that referred to
in Section 9-302(3) (b). Although the registration receipt is made sub-
stantially the equivalent of a certificate of title, the court concludes that
the statute was not intended to be a means of perfecting a security interest.
It bases this determination, inter alia, upon the fact that another statute
requires that the lien instrument mentioned in Ken. Rev. Stat. 186.195
be filed according to the Code, just as other financing statements.
However, because no express penalty is provided for a failure to
comply with 186.195, the court determines that compliance with it is a
condition precedent to filing the security transaction under the Code,
except in the case of a dealer's inventory, where such a requirement
would be impractical. Thus, the secured party must both send the
registration receipt to the county clerk and file his financing statement
as required by Code Section 9-302(1).
[Annotator's Comment: The Kentucky legislature unnecessarily
violated a fundamental policy of the Uniform Commercial Code by a
statute compliance with which the court construes as a condition
precedent to filing under Section 9-302(1). A purpose of the Code,
declared in Section 1-102(2) (a) is to simplify commercial law.
The result in the instant case is unnecessary additional red tape. Rather
than the one step prescribed by the Code, the secured party must now
perform two distinct steps to protect his interest.
If the legislature desired the registration receipt requirement as
a preferable method for perfection of security interests, it should not
have required also filing under the Code. Section 9-302(3) (h) would
have allowed this substitute for the Code's filing requirement had the
statute been properly drafted. Although enacted very shortly after the
Uniform Commercial Code, the statute makes no effort to complement
it; even terms not found in the Code, such as "lien instrument," are
introduced. The court was justified in its restrained impatience with
legislature.]
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
43
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods
(2) A buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600
(1961).
An acceptance company which had filed according to Section 9-
302(1) its blanket security agreement covering the inventory proceeds
from sales of a certain automobile dealer could not recover an automo-
bile purchased by the defendant from the automobile dealer after the
filing of the security agreement. For a further disCussion of this case,
see supra, Section 9-302.
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 draft of the Code,
Section 9-307 of which read: "In the case of inventory . . . a buyer in
ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest even though
perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms of the security
agreement."'
SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statements
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and
the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which informa-
tion concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing
the items, of collateral. . . .
Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961)
The court held that several Kentucky statutes had no application
to the field of secured transactions because of their inconsistency with
the Code. These statutes included: (a) one declaring that no deed of
trust or mortgage shall be valid against innocent third parties unless
"acknowledged or proved according to Iaw and lodged for record" (the
Code requires no acknowledgment); and (b) one declaring that no
deed, deed of trust, or mortgage may be recorded unless it states the
date and maturity of the secured obligation (this is in conflict with
Code Section 9-403, which holds that a financing statement is effective
for five years from the date of filing if the date is not shown on the
instrument or if the period on the instrument extends for more than five
years). Another such statute, relating to Section 9
-302(3), is discussed
supra.
The court noted that, although several other statutes had been
expressly repealed by the act adopting the Code, the discovery of incon-
sistencies and obsolete matter was a formidable task requiring years,
rather than a simple search by a legislative committee.
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
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A dissenting opinion, noting the omission of the general repealer
section of the Code in the Kentucky enactment, expresses the view
that these two statutes are not repealed by implication. The dissent believes
that there should be no repeal by implication unless statutes are neces-
sarily inconsistent. This is not the case here, since, even with the adop-
tion of the Code, the two statutes which the majority is overthrowing
in the area of secured transactions serve a worthwhile purpose in that
area, as evidenced by the fact that the legislature has recently retained
similar requirements in other statutes. The dissent also notes that other
sections of the same chapter which contains these two statutes have
been expressly repealed by the act adopting the Code.
[Annotator's Comment: The decision as to these two statutes is in
accord with the policy of the Code to simplify commercial law (Section
1-102(2) (a)). It is noteworthy that this result is reached in spite of the
legislature's failure to include the general repealer section of the Code
(Section 10-103). See supra, Section 9-302(3) (b) for further discussion
of this case.]
SECTION 9-403. What Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing; Effect
of Lapsed Filing; Duties of Filing Officer
(2) A filed financing statement which states a maturity date of the
obligation secured of five years or less is effective until such maturity date.
. . . Any other filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years
from the date of filing.
Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961)
See Section 9-402 supra, for the annotation of this case in respect
to this section.
SECTION 9-504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral after
Default; Effect of Disposition
(3) Unless collateral ... is of a type customarily sold on a recognized
market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor.
Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 171 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1961)
Notice must be given a debtor upon the proposed resale of a re-
possessed used car since there is no recognized market for used cars. Prices
of such cars are subject to a wide range of pricing procedures and are
not arrived at in the open, based upon asking prices of sellers and bids
of prospective buyers. Prices quoted in the "red book" are not sell and
bid prices, but are merely for the convenience of the dealer.
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
45
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
SECTION 9-507. Secured Party's Liability for Failure to Comply
with this Part
Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 171 A.2d 548 (Pa, 1961)
Debtor could have deficiency judgment opened after resale of re-
possessed used car where it was shown, inter alia, that the required notice
of Section 9-504(3) had not been given debtor prior to the sale. While
the rights of Section 9-504 (Sic; 9-507?) are available to the debtor,
there is no limitation upon the means of exercising them.
[Annotator's Comment: Since plaintiff creditor admitted applica-
bility of, and noncompliance with, Section 9-504(3), debtor will be en-
titled to any loss and, in any event, since the car is a consumer good, to
"an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per cent of
the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten
per cent of the cash price." Section 9-507(1). Debtor contended the
sale price was "grossly inadequate" which, if proved, may allow greater
recovery, but the factor that a better price was obtainable at a different
time or in a different method does not of itself establish that the sale
was not commercially reasonable. Section 9-507(2).1
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion
is set out)
46
